My research focuses on classical political philosophy and its fraught relationship to modern—especially liberal-democratic—political thought. My primary interests in this area concern the politics of ethical authority and the political psychology of lawfulness. The rule of law is widely held to be one of the greatest achievements of liberal democracy. But it is also an idea beset by paradox—for how can power be limited by law if law itself is the creature of power? If law ultimately originates with some of the very agents whom it would constrain, then won’t it reflect the advantage of those agents rather than a curb on their discretion? This problem is coeval with the rule of law and is widely discussed in the scholarly literature (Hutchinson & Monahan 1987, Waluchow 2014). Even so, few have turned to classical political thought for help in thinking it through. This is unfortunate because the dimensions of the problem that the classical theories emphasize are seldom discussed by modern scholars yet endure in modern societies. These pertain to the excellences of character needed to sustain lawfulness and observe political moderation. Laws cannot create and administer themselves. However much they might limit the prerogatives of office-holders, constitutions must permit them some discretionary powers, and these are easily abused if politicians are insufficiently respectful of the laws they are sworn to uphold. That is why the rule of law depends as much on the virtues of office-holders as on the institutions that constrain them. And the most sophisticated accounts of these virtues remain those formulated by the political philosophers of classical antiquity.